As we arrived for work on Monday, Feb 13th, 1989, everyone whose job title included “manager” was alerted to stand by to be transported to a different location. Soon it became apparent that the fleet of 3 or 4 Douglas interplant busses had been augmented by the rental of large number of school busses.
I was “branch-manager” for hydraulics and flight controls, a position I had recently been appointed to. We were soon loaded onto the busses and transported to newly completed building 58, a paint hangar. It was big enough to several MD-11s, offering protection from the wind, and facilitating better control of air pollution. It hadn’t yet been used for painting, and the floor had been set with about 5000 folding chairs in front of a makeshift stage.
This was our introduction to newlyi appointed Douglas Aircraft Co. President Bob Hood. He promptly explained that the company planned to improve the management of the company by assuring that it had the best person in each management position. Then the real zinger. “YOU HAVE ALL LOST YOUR JOBS. But you will be able to re-apply for those jobs, or for new positions we have created.” It turned out that there were to be 4000 manager jobs in the redesigned organization, So 1000 managers would be out of a job when the music stopped. Harvard Business School strikes again. Responses to Hood’s cheerleading were subdued.
This was one day before Vaentine’s day, so in some quarters it was referred to as the Valentine’s Eve Massacre. In Hood’s defense, an organization with 5000 managers can probabliy get along with fewer.
In these blogs, I have expressed some misgivings, maybe even disdain, with regard to some of the procedures foisted on us by the Harvard Business School. Perhaps our management simply didn’t know how to apply those procedures. I was influenced by a book entitled “Up the Organization” by Robert C. Townsend, 1970. Townsend was CEO of Avis Rent-a Car (We’re number two, so we try harder.) He had nothing but criticism of Harvard Business School teachings, detailing point by point where they were wrong. Some people have said that all they needed to know about business management;, they learned from Townsend’s book. He followed up with an expanded edition “Further Up the Organization” about 1983, with the admonition “pay attention this time, I’m not going to tell you again.”
During the few weeks following the “paint booth” episode, we were evaluated by a team of consultants from outside the company. Several high-level managers, who probably were “the best person for the job”, chose to retire rather than put up with this foolishness.
The main event was a test of common sense and resourcefulness, and ability to be a “team player.” It was part written and part oral. My challenge was something like “your spacecraft has crash-landed on the moon. Here are the conditions, and your resources. What is your course of action?”
I “passed” the evaluation. However, I was near normal retirement age, and already past the early-retirement age under the company’s “85” plan (age plus years of service.) The best man for the job was someone who would be there for a while. So I wound up one level below my previous position (but at the same pay.) I stayed with the company longer than the man who replaced me.
Shortly after that exercise, the MD-95 airplane project was established, and I became the cognizant designer of the hydro-mechanical systems. Administratively, we were under the larger commercial aircraft hydro-mechanical group.
Boeing bought MacDonnell-Douglas part way through the design phase of the MD-95, and we wondered whether the project would continue. At the time, it seemed that the 106-passenger MD-95 would be a hot seller, complimentary to Boeing’s 126 passenger 737 aircraft, so Boeing decided to continue the project, but renamed it the Boeing 717.
This was the project which carried me through to retirement at age 72. In addition to being the cognizant designer for hydraulics, I was the FAA’s “DER” (Designated Engineering Representative) for hydraulics, coordinating certification procedures for qualifying the airplane to Federal Air Regulations (FAR Part 25).
Boeing’s sales department at Seattle had no interest in selling B-717s. Any airline which expressed an interest in buying 717s was given the bait-and-switch routine, steering them to B-737s. So when the 156 airplanes on our order book were delivered, that was the last of the “Douglas” airliners.